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Sharber: Equal Protection in Zoning - Restricting Dwelling Use to No More

CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Equal Protection In ZoningRestricting Dwelling Use To No More Than Two
Unrelated Persons Is Constitutional.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, -

U.S.

-,

94 S. Ct. 1536, 39 L. Ed.

2d 797 (1974).
The Village of Belle Terre, a one square mile suburban municipality in
New York, was zoned exclusively for one-family dwellings in 1971.1 The
ordinance prohibited more than two unrelated persons from occupying a residence within the confines of the village.
On December 31, 1971, plaintiffs Edwin and Judith Dickman rented their
six-bedroom home to six unrelated students, including plaintiffs Bruce Boraas, Anne Parish and Michael Truman. On June 8, 1972, the students were
informed that they were violating the zoning ordinance. On July 31, 1972,
the Dickmans were served with an "Order to Remedy Violations" which
notified them that failure to correct the violation might subject them to liability commencing on August 3, 1972.2

On August 2, 1972, plaintiffs commenced an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York8 against the mayor and
trustees of Belle Terre alleging that the zoning ordinance deprived them of
1. 40 BROOKLYN L. Rlv. 226 (1973),
BuILDING ZONE ORDINANCE,

quoting VILLAGE OF BELLE TERSE,

N.Y.,

art. I, § D-1.35a (1971), which defined family as follows:

Family. One or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A
number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a
single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption or marriage shall

be deemed to constitute a family.
2. 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 226 (1973), quoting VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE, N.Y.,
BUILDING ZONE ORDINANCE, art. VIII, § M-1.4a(2) (1971), which provided for the following enforcement of the zoning code:
Each violation of this Ordinance shall constitute disorderly conduct. Every person
violating this Ordinance, including the owner . . . and lessee or tenant of an entire
building or structure or premise in which part such violation has been committed
or shall exist . . . or any person who knowingly commits, takes part or assists in
any such violation . . . shall be a disorderly person and shall be liable for and
pay a penalty not exceeding One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) or by imprisonment
for a period not exceeding 60 days or by both such fine and imprisonment. A
separate and distinct offense shall be committed on each day during or on which
a violation occurs or continues.
3. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 476
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1974).
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equal protection of the law and violated their constitutional rights of associa-

tion and privacy. The defendants alleged that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of police power because it controlled population density, prevented
traffic and parking congestion, and promoted a family neighborhood. The

district court upheld the validity of the ordinance. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit 4 reversed, holding the ordinance to be
a denial of equal protection. The Village of Belle Terre appealed to the

United States Supreme Court. Held-Reversed. A zoning ordinance which
restricts land use to families or not more than two unrelated persons does
not impinge on any fundamental constitutional rights, and is valid because

it bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective of providing
a quiet, uncongested neighborhood attractive to families. 5
Zoning is the division of a community into districts by legislative regulations which prescribe the uses to which buildings may be put." Since every
zoning ordinance restricts the way a person may use his property, it follows
that such ordinances represent a restriction on every person's freedom to ex-

ercise the prohibited use. 7 However, the government's power to interfere
with the rights of a landowner or user by restricting the character of permitted uses is not unlimited. 8 Once a municipality has the authority to pass
a zoning ordinance, there are two criteria which can be applied to determine
if the ordinance is valid."
The first test in resolving the validity of a zoning law is to ascertain

whether it is reasonably related to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.' 0 In determining the "reasonableness" of a zoning law, cog4. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806
5. - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1541, 39 L. Ed. 2d
6. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381,
beth City v. Aydlett, 161 S.E. 78, 79 (N.C. 1931).
NICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§ 25.07, at 28 (3d ed. 1965).

(2d Cir. 1973).
797, 804 (1974).
384 (Cal. 1925); City of ElizaSee also 8 E. MCQUILLAN, MU-

7. Circuit Court Judge Mansfield stated:
[W]e start on the premise that almost every local zoning ordinance represents a
resriction upon citizens' freedom of action in the exercise of otherwise lawful and
constitutional rights with respect to the use of their land, whether it be in the operation of a business or the construction of a home.
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 812 (2d Cir. 1973).
8. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court stated: "Determination
by the legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or
conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts." Id, at 400. See also Nectow
v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works,
234 P. 381, 383 (Cal. 1925).

9. 8A E.

MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS

§ 25.294, at 342-43 (3d ed.

1965).
10. All zoning ordinances are required to benefit the municipality in some manner.
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526,
531 (1917); Crownover v. Musick, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 693 (1973); Baccus v. City
of Dallas, 450 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970), writ rel'd n.r.e., 454
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Sup. 1970); Reichert v. City of Hunter's Creek Village, 345 S.W.2d
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nizance must be taken of the problem to be solved by the municipality.,
If the classifications made between prohibited and permissible uses are not
arbitrary or unreasonable, the zoning law will be upheld.' 2 In fact, if the
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes is "fairly debatable," the legislative judgment will be allowed to control.' 3 This test is simply a process of discovering the objectives sought by the legislative body in
enacting the law, and then determining whether the law, through these objectives, advances the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community.
Even though a zoning ordinance might be found pertinent to the health,
safety, or general welfare of the community, the ordinance must meet still
a further test in that it must not be in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment.' 4 The right to equal protection of
the law is a constitutional protection against what is frequently referred to
as class legislation;' 5 there must always be a reasonable ground for making
a distinction between those falling within a given class and those who do
not. 16 The -initial step in resolving the equal protection question is to decide
whether the challenged classification is to be tested according to the tradi17
tional standard or the strict scrutiny standard. '
The traditional equal protection test requires that the zoning ordinance

be rationally related to a permissible state objective.' 8

There must be a

838, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also 8 E. MCQUILLIN,
MuNIcIPAL CORPaORTIONS § 25.18, at 55 (3d ed. 1965).
11. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 271 A.2d
430, 433 (N.J. Super. 1970).
12. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242
U.S. 526, 529 (1917); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 281 A.2d 513,
518 (N.J. 1971); Baccus v. City of Dallas, 450 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas), writ ref'd n.r.e., 454 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
13. In Radice v. State, 264 U.S. 292 (1924), the Court stated:
Where the constitutional validity of a statute depends upon the existence of facts,
courts must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them contrary to
that reached by the legislature; and if the question of what the facts establish be
a fairly debatable one, it is not permissible for the judge to set up his opinion
in respect of it against the opinion of the lawmaker.
Id. at 294. See also Baccus v. City of Dallas, 450 S.W. 389, 392 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas), writ rej'd n.r.e., 454 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Sup. 1970); Reichert v. City of Hunter's Creek Village, 345 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
14. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
15. Myer v. Myer, 66 N.Y.S.2d 83, 90 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
16. Cotten v. Wilson, 178 P.2d 287, 290 (Wash. 1947).
17. Alexander v. Kammer, 363 F. Supp. 324, 325 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
18. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 93 S.
Ct. 1278, 1300, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 47 (1974); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447
(1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
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legitimate public interest behind the classification contained in any zoning
ordinance. Equal protection is denied only if the classification is without
any reasonable basis.' 9 If, upon judicial scrutiny, there is any evidence
which would indicate a reasonable basis for the zoning ordinance, the ordinance will be sustained.2 0 Under the traditional approach, the party challenging an ordinance has the burden of proving that the classification is arbitrary because there is a presumption of reasonableness, validity, and con2
stitutionality of zoning ordinances. '
The strict scrutiny test is applicable when a fundamental or constitutional
right is concerned. 22 This test was clearly stated by the Supreme Court in
28
Shapirov. Thompson:
[A]ppellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification
which serves -to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be
to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconnecessary 24
stitutional.

The strict scrutiny equal protection test demands that the municipality show
a compelling reason for passing a zoning ordinance which violates a fundamental right. Unlike the traditional test, the burden of proof shifts to the
municipality when a fundamental right is concerned as there is no longer
25

a presumption of validity.

425-26 (1961); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Alexander
v. Kammer, 363 F. Supp. 324, 325 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
19. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); Baccus v. City of Dallas, 450 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ refd n.r.e., 454 S.W.2d
391 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
20. A good definition of the traditional equal protection test was articulated by
Chief Justice Warren in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961):
mhe Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. .. . A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may'be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26.
21. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); City of Lubbock v. Stewart, 462 S.W.2d
48, 49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970, no writ); Baccus v. City of Dallas, 450
S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas); writ ref'd n.r.e., 454 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Sup.
1970). See also 8A E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.295, at 345-46 (3d
ed. 1965).
22. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.
Ct. 1278, 1287, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 33 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969); Alexander v. Kammer, 363 F. Supp. 324, 325 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
23. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
24. Id. at 634.
25. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16, 93 S.
Ct. 1278, 1288, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 33 (1973).
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The plaintiffs in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas26 alleged that the zoning ordinance denied them equal protection of the law and violated their
constitutional rights of association and privacy. The question of whether
the zoning ordinance infringed on any constitutional right was crucial to the
outcome of the case because the answer determined which equal protection
test was applicable.
A fundamental constitutional right is one which is either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 27 The leading case of Griswold v.
Connecticut28 stated the requirement for finding an implied constitutional
right as follows:
The inquiry is whether a right involved "is of such a character that it
cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political

institutions ....

29

Although the right of association is not mentioned in the United States
Constitution, the first amendment has been construed to include -the right
of association as a constitutional right.3 0 The right of association is the right
to assemble for the advancement of beliefs and ideas3' and the right to ex32
press one's attitudes and philosophies by membership in a group.
The Supreme Court had little difficulty deciding that the plaintiffs' right
of association had not been violated. Without stating the reasoning behind
this determination, the Court simply stated: "It involves no 'fundamental'
right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as . . . the right of association
"33

Justice Marshall, however, based his dissent on the ground that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been violated, including the plaintiffs' right of
association.3 4 He felt that the ordinance "undertakes to regulate the way
people choose to associate with each other within the privacy of their own
homes.13 5 As authority for his position, he cited three cases which held
that unions had the right to associate with lawyers to assert their legal rights
because it pertained to the social and economic benefit of the members.3 6
26. -

U.S. -,

94 S. Ct. 1536, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1974).

27. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33, 93 S.
Ct. 1278, 1297, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 43 (1973); Cieliczka v. Johnson, 363 F. Supp. 453,
457 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. Id. at 493.
30. Id. at 482.
31. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958).

32. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
33. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, - U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1540, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 797, 803 (1974).
34. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1544, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 807-808.
35. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1545, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 809.
36. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); U.M.W. v. Illi-
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Justice Marshall concluded that "the selection of one's living companions involves similar choices as to the emotional, social, or economic benefits to
'8 7
be derived from alternative living arrangements.
The Belle Terre ordinance made it unlawful for three or more unrelated
persons to live together within a village composed of a land area of about
one square mile. The ordinance did not "regulate the way people choose
to associate" or prohibit "the selection of one's living companions." Instead,
the ordinance created a restriction on where people may associate. In fact,
if Justice Marshall's reasoning were adopted, all zoning ordinances which
prohibit certain uses of land would violate the right of association. For example, a family could assert that a zoning ordinance which restricts a certain land area to industries, a common zoning restriction in cities, violates
their right of association because they are prohibited from associating in that
area. In Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan,3 8 a case involving an almost
identical ordinance to the one in question, the court stated: "The right
to form such groups may be constitutionally protected, but the right to insist
that these groups live under the same roof, in any part of the city they
choose, is not."'3 9 Although one can only speculate as to the Court's reason
for holding that the plaintiffs' right of association was not infringed, this
might well have been its rationale.
The plaintiffs also asserted that the ordinance violated their fundamental
right of privacy. 40 The implied constitutional right of privacy is as vague
as the implied constitutional right of association, as shown by this statement
in Roe v. Wade: 4 1 "[O]nly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental'
or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee
'42
of personal privacy."

Disagreeing with the majority, Justice Marshall felt that the plaintiffs'
right of privacy had been violated because the choice of household companions "involves deeply personal considerations as to the kind and quality
of intimate relationships within the home. ' ' 43

As authority for his belief that

such a personal interest should be constitutionally protected, he cited three
nois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). These cases all held that unions
had the right to hire lawyers and associate for the purpose of asserting their legal
rights under the constitutional right of association.
37.

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, -

U.S.

-,

94 S. Ct. 1536, 1544, 39 L. Ed.

-,

2d 797, 808 (1974).
38. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
39. Id. at 911-12.
40. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, - U.S.-, -, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1540, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 797, 803 (1974).
41. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973).
42. id. at 152, 93 S. Ct. at 726, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 176.
43. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, -

Ed. 2d 797, 808 (1974).
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cases which uphold the right of privacy in three areas involving personal
and intimate relationships-the right of unmarried women to use contraceptives, 44 the right of married women to use contraceptives, 45 and the right
46
to read obscene material within the privacy of one's home.
As evidenced by the cases cited, the constitutional right of privacy has
been upheld only when private or personal relationships have been involved.
It is not clearly ascertainable whether the ordinance in question imposes a
restriction on a relationship as personal as those in past cases. Since the
test of whether a fundamental right is involved is so vague, 47 the issue of
whether unrelated persons should be afforded the constitutional right of privacy in having absolute freedom in selecting their living companions is not
only a debatable question, but also one of personal opinion. The majority
evidently felt that no personal rights were invaded by the ordinance. 48 Furthermore, even if one were to believe that the choice of unrelated living
companions warrants constitutional protection, the ordinance in question
would still be constitutional due to the particular fact situation in Belle
Terre. Belle Terre encompasses only a one square mile land area and there
is no present threat that exclusion from Belle Terre would deny to the plaintiff students the right to live as the group that they are. On the other hand,
if a city were to pass an ordinance prohibiting more than two unrelated persons from living together anywhere in the entire city, it is safe to speculate
49
that such ordinance would be held unconstitutional.
Since the majority found that the ordinance did not impinge on any fundamental rights of the plaintiffs, it applied the less stringent traditional equal
protection test, rather than the strict scrutiny test. If an ordinance promotes
a legitimate public interest it must be upheld under the traditional test. 50
The Village of Belle Terre alleged that the ordinance was enacted to control population density, prevent traffic and parking congestion, and to promote a family neighborhood. 51 In determining if the ordinance denied
equal protection, the Court was left with two questions: (1) are any of
44. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US. 438, 447 (1972).
45. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515-16 (1965).
46. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 558 (1969).
47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965).

48. The majority opinion gave no reason for holding that the constitutional right
of privacy was not involved. The opinion merely stated that it does not involve "any
rights of privacy."

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, -

U.S.

-,

-,

94 S. Ct. 1536,

1540, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 803 (1974).
49. If a large city were to pass a similar ordinance, the burdens and hardships
placed on unrelated persons would probably be held to be "unreasonable." Such an
ordinance would be invalid because all zoning laws must be reasonable. Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
50. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.

71, 76 (1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
51. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, -

L. Ed. 2d 797, 807 (1974).
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these objectives a legitimate state interest; and (2) if so, was the objective
reasonably achieved by the ordinance?
A multitude of cases have held that -the control of population density is
a legitimate zoning objective. 52 The conflict in Belle Terre was whether the
ordinance did in fact control population density and whether this objective
was accomplished in a reasonable, non-arbitrary manner as required by the
Equal Protection Clause. 53 The Belle Terre ordinance restricts more than
two unrelated persons from living together, but contains no restriction on
the number of related persons who may live together. The plaintiffs lived
in a household containing six unrelated persons. An initial question might
be whether a family containing less than six members will replace the plaintiffs in the Belle Terre home. Since many families contain less than six
members, one's immediate response to this question might be that the ordinance appears to control population density. The number of persons sharing a home, however, is dependent on the relationship of the group and the
number of rooms in the home. For example, parents usually share a room
and in many instances young children share another room. The result is
that a dwelling will normally accomodate a larger number of family members than unrelated persons. 4 Under this normal situation, it is very likely
that, at least in some instances, the ordinance by removing unrelated persons
from homes will actually operate to increase population density because families of a larger size will move into the vacant homes. 55
Whether the population in Belle Terre would be limited by the ordinance
also depends on the composition of families which move into the Village,
because it cannot be disputed that many families are composed of more than
three members. 56 This realization might have prompted the following statement by Circuit Judge Mansfield: "To theorize that groups of unrelated
members would have more occupants per house than would traditional fam52. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926); Boraas v. Village of
Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 812 (2d Cir. 1973); Van Sicklen v. Browne, 92 Cal. Rptr.
786, 790 (Ct. App. 1971); Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908,
912 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973); Midwest Bank & Trust
Co. v. City of Chicago, 273 N.E.2d 519, 522 (I11.
Ct. App. 1971); Kirsch Holding
Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 281 A.2d 513, 520 (N.J. 1971); Josephs v. Town Bd.,
198 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698-99 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
53. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971); Baccus v. City of Dallas, 450 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas), writ refd n.r.e., 454 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Supp. 1970).
54. E.g., Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1973), the
six unrelated students all had separate bedrooms.
55. For example, a three bedroom home will normally accommodate only three unrelated persons, while a family of five or six could comfortably live in the same home
with the parents and children sharing bedrooms.
56. There are some 220 residences in Belle Terre occupied by about 700 persons.
The average family therefore consists of over three members. Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, - U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1537, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 810 (1974).
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ily groups, .

.

. would be rank speculation .

.

.

,,57

Furthermore, even if

the ordinance could be construed to control population density, the manner
in which the objective was sought is arbitrary. If the Village in fact intended
to control population density, such objective could be achieved without discrimination against unrelated groups by simply limiting the occupancy of all
homes, whether occupied by related or unrelated persons. 58 The majority
opinion recognized that controlling population density is a valid zoning objective, but it failed to determine if the ordinance actually achieved this objective.
A second objective sought by the ordinance was to prevent traffic and
parking congestion.5 9 This also is recognized as a valid zoning objective.60
The Village Council theorized that families usually own fewer cars than unrelated persons. Although such an assumption may not be universally
true, 61 it is more probable that families will own a smaller number of cars
than unrelated persons. 62 For example, it is unlikely that a family of three
with a young child will own as many cars as a group of three unrelated
persons. Of course, the number of cars in a family will depend on many
varying factors, such as the age of the children, the family financial status,
or whether both spouses have outside jobs, but it is safe to surmise that most
families will own fewer cars than an equal number of unrelated persons.
It is consequently fairly debatable whether families will own fewer cars than
unrelated households. Under the traditional equal protection test, an ordinance who's validity is fairly debatable will be upheld. 63 Therefore, the
objective of preventing traffic and parking congestion did not violate equal
protection.
57. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 816 (2d Cir. 1973).

58. Judge Mansfield stated:
[Sluch an objective could be achieved more rationally and without discrimination
against unrelated groups by regulation of the number of bedrooms in a dwelling
structure, by restriction of the ratio of persons to bedrooms, or simply by limitation of occupancy to a single housekeeping unit.
Id. at 817.
59. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, -U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1543, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 797, 807 (1974).
60. E.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926); Boraas v. Village of Belle TerTe, 476 F.2d 806, 812 (2d Cir. 1973).
61. In Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), Circuit Judge
Timbers in his dissent stated: "The Village need not establish that there always is a
difference between unrelated groups and families with respect to these problems. It
is enough that such differences usually exist." Id. at 824.

62. Id. at 824. "[The ordinance is related to the prevention of traffic, parking,
and noise problems. These problems occur when one-family homes become occupied

by large groups of unrelated persons. There are likely to be more people and more
motor vehicles." Id. at 824.
63. Radice v. State, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924); Baccus v. City of Dallas, 450
S.W.2d 389, 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ refd n.r.e., 454 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Sup.
1970); Reichert v. City of Hunter's Creek Village, 345 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Another objective sought through the ordinance was to promote a family
neighborhood.6 4 Circuit Judge Mansfield felt that the objective of making
the Village of Belle Terre attractive to families was not a proper exercise
of zoning authority: "Such social preferences, however, while permissible
in a private club, have no relevance to public health, safety or welfare."6 5
Even Supreme Court Justice Marshall, however, in his dissenting opinion,
admitted that making a community attractive to families was a legitimate
zoning objective.66 This appears to be the better view. Most people would
tend to agree that a community containing mostly families is more conducive
to the happiness of married couples and is a better environment in which
67
to raise their children.
It could be asserted that if the Village had wanted to promote a family
neighborhood, then all unrelated persons would have been banned from living in the neighborhood, instead of limiting the number of unrelated persons
to two. Circuit Court Judge Timbers, in his dissent, 68 answered this problem effectively:
The Village reasonably determined that two unrelated persons living
in the same household would not substantially change the character of
the neighborhood. Whether the limit should have been three or four
unrelated persons, is a matter on which the Village is entitled to some
flexibility. The limitation clearly contributes to the objectives of preserving a family neighborhood. 69
The initial question concerning the validity of the Belle Terre ordinance
was whether the plaintiffs' constitutional rights of association or privacy had
been violated. The answer to this question was the key issue in the case
because it determined which equal protection test, traditional or strict scrutiny, was applicable. There is no doubt that Belle Terre could not have
met the strict scrutiny test requirement that a municipality must show a compelling reason for enacting a zoning ordinance. An analysis of the constitutional rights of association and privacy showed that the Supreme Court
correctly held that no constitutional rights were invaded, making the traditional test controlling. The remaining issue was whether the Belle Terre
ordinance achieved a permissible state objective in a reasonable, non-arbitrary manner. Although the objective of controlling population density was
64. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, - U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1543, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 797, 807 (1974).
65. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 815 (2d Cir. 1973).
66. Village of Belle Terre, -

U.S.

-,

-,

94 S. Ct. 1536, 1543, 39 L. Ed. 2d

797, 807 (1974).
67. In Plaza Recreational Center v. Sioux City, 111 N.W.2d 758 (Iowa 1961), the
court stated: "Zoning regulations promote the general welfare and are valid where they
. . .promote the permanency of desirable home surroundings and add to the happiness
and comfort of citizens." Id. at 763.
68. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 818 (2d Cir. 1973).
69. Id. at 823.
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shown to have been pursued in an arbitrary manner, the remaining two objectives, controlling traffic and parking congestion and promoting a family
neighborhood, were proved to be valid exercises of zoning authority. Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the ordinance was justified.
Although the Supreme Court was correct in its final decision, a bit of criticism is proper. The Belle Terre case received lengthy discussion at both
the district court and appellate court levels. When the case came before
the Supreme Court, it was given insufficient attention. The majority opinion
did not discuss whether the council's objectives were actually being furthered
by the ordinance, nor did it discuss why any constitutional rights were not
involved. A better guide for the future would have resulted if -the Supreme
Court had given an insight to the reasoning behind the decision it rendered.
A possible consequence of the case may be a nationwide tendency to pass
ordinances similar to the one in the instant case. 70 One danger of such a
reaction would be a substantial limitation on unrelated persons living preferences and accommodations. This danger was recognized by the district
court when the plaintiffs suggested that surrounding communities might pass
similar ordinances, thereby preventing them from living together as a group:
"Should that occur then plainly the facts will have changed and a different
1
case will have been presented than is now presented."'
A further danger might be that communities will pass such ordinances
under the guise of a proper legislative objective when in fact they are passing judgment on "undesirable" lifestyles. For example, a municipality might
pass such an ordinance in order to prevent the cohabitation of unmarried
72
persons, which is clearly outside the scope of zoning authority.
The decision in Belle Terre must be kept in its proper perspective.
Since the Village of Belle Terre contains a land area of only one
square mile, it is doubtful whether a large city could pass a similar ordinance
70. Ordinances in other states similar to the Belle Terre ordinance have been involved in litigation in the following states: California (Palo Alto Tenants Union v.
Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 909 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.
1973)); Illinois (City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 216 N.E.2d 116, 117 (Ill.
1966));
New Jersey (Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 271 A.2d 430, 435

(N.J. Super. 1970)); cf. District of Columbia (Moreno v. United States Dep't. of Agriculture, 413 U.S. 528 (1972)).

71. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 147-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
72. In fact, the plaintiffs in the Belle Terre case alleged that the ordinance was
enacted to prevent unrelated persons from living together. The Supreme Court, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, gave this response:

U.S. -,

94 S. Ct. 1536, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1974),

It is said that the Belle Terre ordinance reeks with an animosity to unmarried
couples who live together. There is no evidence to support it; and the provision
of the ordinance bringing within the definition of a "family" two unmarried people
belies the charge.

Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1541, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 804.
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